In this paper, we study the secrecy capacity region for the 3-receiver broadcast channel (BC) with degraded message sets, where a confidential message is kept secret from one of the receivers. This model is more general than the previously studied degraded broadcast channel (BC) with confidential messages, as the wiretap receiver is supposed to receive the common message. Our main results are the inner and outer bounds, which we derive using Wyner's code partitioning in tandem with double-binning. For the case in which the receiver with the confidential message is less noisy than the wiretapper, the inner and outer bounds coincide and give the secrecy capacity region of this channel.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent studies on the broadcast channel (BC) with confidential messages, the authors in [1] and Ekrem and Ulukus in [2] independently studied the K-receiver BC with an external wiretapper. In [1] , the K-receiver BC with confidential messages sent to each receiver was studied, while in [2] , the same scenario was studied with the addition that each receiver also received a common message. Both used the degraded BC.
Recently in [3] , Nair and El Gamal introduced the channel model of BC with degraded message sets, which is a more general model than the degraded BC without secrecy constraints. In this model, a common message is sent to all of the receivers, denoted by the set R all , and the private messages, W 1 , . . . , W i , are sent to subsets of receivers R i ⊂ R i−1 ⊂ · · · ⊂ R 1 ⊂ R all . In [3] , the 3-receiver BC with 2 degraded message sets where the common message is sent to all three receivers and a private message is sent to the first receiver was addressed. Both inner and outer bounds were obtained. In particular, the inner capacity bound is shown to be achievable by superposition coding, Marton's achievability technique [4] and indirect decoding, in which the second and the third receivers decode the common message via satellite codewords instead of cloud centers. The outer bound is also shown to match the inner bound when the first receiver is less noisy than the third receiver [5] , a more general condition than degradedness.
In this paper, we consider the 3-receiver BC with 2 degraded message sets, as in [3] , but the third receiver is regarded as a wiretapper from which the private message is to be kept secret. As the wiretapper in this case also decodes the common message, this model describes a more general scenario than the one with an external wiretapper. We shall use a combination of the code partitioning of Wyner [6] and double-binning of Liu et al. [7] to show achievability of an inner bound. Equivocation calculation for the private message is also provided. For the outer bound, we show the converse proof first for the general case; then, under the condition that the first receiver, which receives the private message, is less noisy than the third receiver, the inner and outer bounds coincide, giving the secrecy capacity region of the BC with degraded message sets.
Throughout this paper, we use the uppercase letter to denote a random variable (e.g., X) and the lowercase letter for its realization (e.g., x). The alphabet set of X is denoted by X so that x ∈ X . We denote a sequence of n random variables by X = (X 1 , . . . , X n ) with its realization x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ X n if x i ∈ X for i = 1, 2, . . . , n. Furthermore, we define the subsequences of X as X i (X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X i ) andX i (X i , . . . , X n ), which we shall use in the proof of converse.
II. THE 3-RECEIVER BC WITH DEGRADED MESSAGE SETS
The discrete memoryless BC with 3 receivers has an input random sequence, X, and 3 output random sequences, Y 1 , Y 2 and Y 3 , at the receivers, all of length n, with x ∈ X n , y 1 ∈ Y n 1 , y 2 ∈ Y n 2 , and y 3 ∈ Y n 3 . A (2 nR0 , 2 nR1 , n)-code for the 3-receiver BC with 2 degraded message sets consists of W 0 = 1, . . . , 2 nR0 , (common message set)
In particular, we have
0 , where the notation "(·)" highlights that the decoded messages are estimates, with the error probability
In this setup, Y 3 is the wiretapper, and the secrecy level of W 1 at user 1 is defined by the equivocation rate 1 n H(W 1 |Y 3 ).
III. SECRECY CAPACITY REGION
The rate triple (R 0 , R 1 , R 1e ) is said to be achievable if for any , 1 > 0, there exists a sequence of (2 nR0 , 2 nR1 , n)codes for which P (n) e ≤ and equivocation rate R 1e satisfies
The secrecy capacity region (i.e., the rate region with perfect secrecy or R 1e = R 1 ) for the 3-receiver BC with 2 degraded message sets is the closure of the set of all rate-tuples (R 0 , R 1 ) such that (R 0 , R 1 , R 1 ) is achievable. The following two theorems summarize the main results of this paper. Theorem 1: An inner bound to the secrecy capacity region for the 3-receiver BC with 2 degraded message sets is the closure of all rate-tuples (R 0 , R 1 ) satisfying
, and U 1 , U 2 and U 3 are auxiliary random variables and will be defined in Section III-A (random codebook generation). Proof: The proof of achievability for this inner bound is given in Section IV-A with the equivocation calculation to be presented in Section IV-B.
Theorem 2: An outer bound to the secrecy capacity region for the 3-receiver BC with 2 degraded message sets is the closure of all rate-tuples (R 0 , R 1 ) satisfying
where U 1 , U 2 , and U 3 are auxiliary random variables.
Proof: See Section V. Corollary 1: An outer bound to the secrecy capacity region for the 3-receiver BC with 2 degraded message sets for the case where receiver Y 1 is less noisy than receiver Y 3 is the closure of all rate-tuples (R 0 , R 1 ) satisfying
where
, and U 1 and U 2 are auxiliary random variables to be defined in Section V.
Proof: See Section V. We notice that both the inner and outer bounds may be interpreted as the capacity region for the 3-receiver BC with 2 degraded message sets as in [3] , but with the rates at receiver 1 being reduced due to the presence of receiver 3 as a wiretapper.
IV. PROOF OF ACHIEVABILITY

A. Proof for the Inner Bound
The proof of achievability of the inner bound uses Wyner's code partitioning [6] combined with the double-binning scheme of Liu et al. [7] to provide secrecy, together with the coding scheme for the 3-receiver BC with 2 degraded message sets found in [3] . The scheme of [3] represents W 0 by U 1 , then breaks W 1 into 3 parts. The first two parts are combined with U 1 by superposition coding to generate U 2 and U 3 , which are then partitioned into bins. The product bin containing the joint typical pair from U 2 and U 3 (achievable by Marton's coding scheme) is finally combined with the third part of W 1 by superposition coding to obtain X.
At the receivers, Y 1 decodes U 1 , U 2 , U 3 , and X to recover the messages W 0 and W 1 , while receivers Y 2 and Y 3 decode U 2 and U 3 indirectly, respectively, to recover W 0 . In our secure scheme, the codewords U 2 and X are, respectively, protected from receiver Y 3 (i.e., the wiretapper) by a one-sided doublebinning and code partitioning.
Suppose we have the probability density function
The following describes the encoding and decoding processes.
Codebook generation: LetR 1 =S 1 +S 2 +S 3 , and define
where δ 1 > 0 and is small for n sufficiently large. First, generate 2 nR0 sequences U 1 (w 0 ), for w 0 ∈ W 0 , randomly and uniformly from the set of typical U 1 sequences. For each U 1 (w 0 ), generate 2 nV2 sequences U 2 (w 0 , v 2 ) randomly uniformly from the set of conditionally typical U 2 sequences, and also 2 nV3 sequences U 3 (w 0 , v 3 ) randomly uniformly from the set of conditionally typical U 3 sequences. Next randomly partition the sequences, U 2 (w 0 , v 2 ), into 2 nS2 equally-sized bins, and the sequences,
The U 2 codewords undergo a double partition: the first into 2 nS2e bins, and the second further partitions them into 2 nS 2 bins, each of size 2 nS † 2 . On the other hand, the U 3 codewords undergo a single partition into 2 nS3 bins, each of size 2 nS † 3 . For each product bin (s 2 , s 3 ) containing the joint typical [8] ,
Rewrite the joint typical pair as (u 2 (s 2 , s 2 ), u 3 (s 3 )). For each such pair corresponding to the product bin (s 2 , s 2 , s 3 ), generate 2 nS1 sequences of codewords X(w 0 , s 1 , s 1 , s 2 , s 2 , s 3 ), whereS 1 = S 1e + S 1 , for s 1 ∈ {1, . . . , 2 nS1e } and s 1 ∈ {1, . . . , 2 nS 1 }, uniformly randomly over the set of conditionally typical X sequences. The 2 nS1 codwords are partitioned into 2 nS1e subcodes with 2 nS 1 codewords within the subcodes.
Encoding: To send (w 0 , w 1 ), express w 1 by (s 1 , s 2 , s 3 ) and send the codeword x(w 0 , s 1 , s 1 , s 2 , s 2 , s 3 ).
Decoding: Use T n (P Z ) to denote the set of jointly strong typical n-sequence with respect to the p.d.f. p(z). We assume that (w 0 , s 1 , s 2 , s 3 ) = (1, 1, 1, 1) is sent and s 1 and s 2 can be arbitrary. At receiver 1, the decoder seeks the message so that
The error events at receiver 1 may be divided into:
x are not jointly typical with y. By the properties of strong typical sequences [9] , Pr{E 1 } ≤ → 0 for large n.
b) E 2 : w 0 = 1, with arbitrary s 1 , s 2 and s 3 , but u 1 , u 2 , u 3 and x are jointly typical with y. For (9) 1 where δ → 0 for n sufficiently large to be true,
which will be used repeatedly below. Using (6), we have
c) E 3 : w 0 = 1, s 2 , s 3 = 1 , s 1 arbitrary, while u 1 , u 2 , u 3 , x are jointly typical with y. For (12) to be true, we require S 1e + S 1 + S 2e + S 2 + S 3 < I(U 2 , U 3 , X; Y 3 |U 1 ). Then,
d) E 4 : w 0 = 1, s 2 = 1, s 3 = 1 , s 1 arbitrary, while u 1 , u 2 , u 3 , x are jointly typical with y. For (14) to be true, we need
e) E 5 : w 0 = 1, s 2 = 1, s 3 = 1, and s 1 arbitrary, while u 1 , u 2 , u 3 , x are jointly typical with y. For (16) to be true, we require S 1e + S 1 + S 2e + S 2 < I(U 2 , X; Y 1 |U 1 , U 3 ). Then
(17) f) E 6 : w 0 = 1, s 2 = 1, s 3 = 1, s 1 = 1, while u 1 , u 2 , u 3 , x are jointly typical with y. Then, for (18) to be true, we require S 1e + S 1 < I(X; Y 1 |U 1 , U 2 , U 3 ). We then have
1 Equations (9), (12), (14), (16), (18) are at the top of the next two pages.
Consequently, the error probability at receiver 1 is less than 6 i=1 Pr{E i } ≤ 6 . At receivers 2 and 3, indirect decoding is used [3] . At receiver 2, the decoder estimates w 0 such that (u 2 (w 0 , v 2 ), y 2 ) ∈ T n (P U2Y2 ) for any v 2 ∈ {1, . . . , 2 nV2 }. Assuming that (w 0 , v 2 ) = (1, 1) is sent, we require
for the error probabilities at receivers 2 and 3 tending to 0 for n sufficiently large. Combining (7) and (11) to (20) by using Fourier-Motzkin elimination with R 1e = S 1e +S 2e +S 3 = R 1 , we can obtain the secrecy capacity region in Theorem 1.
B. Equivocation calculation
We now show that the equivocation rate satisfies the security condition in (2) . We shall make use of the relation
(21)
where (a), (b) have first two terms by (21); (c) is because it can be shown that H(
. Now, we bound each term in (22). For the first term, by (21), we have
Given u 1 , u 2 and u 3 , X has 2 n(R1e+S 1 +S 2 +S † 2 +S † 3 ) codewords with equal probability. As a consequence,
Also, the second and third terms can be bounded by [7] 
where δ > 0 and is small for n sufficiently large. Then, by Fano's inequality, we have
where 1,n , 2,n → 0 for n sufficiently large. To illustrate that λ(s 1 ), λ(s 2 ) ≤ 2 where → 0 for n sufficiently large so that (26) holds, consider the situation where the wiretapper Y 3 first decodes U 2 given
Pr{(U 1 (w 0 ), U 2 (s 2 , s 2 ), U 3 (s 3 ), X(w 0 , s 1 , s 1 , s 2 , s 2 , s 3 ), y 1 ) ∈ T n (P U1U2U3XY1 )} ≤ 2 n(R0+S1e+S 1 +S2e+S 2 +S3) 2 −n(I(U1,U2,U3,X;Y1)−3δ) ≤ (9)
then decodes X given U 2 = u 2 . The wiretapper decodes U 2 first so that it can use this knowledge to decode X. For fixed
Assuming the wiretapper decodes code sequence U 2 (s 2 , s 2 ) and s 2 = 1 is sent, it can be shown that
where , δ → 0 for n sufficiently large. By the choice for double-binning partition in (6) 
Similarly, λ(s 1 ) ≤ 2 by the choice for code partitioning of S 1 = I(X;
Thus, (26) holds and H(U 2 , X|W 1 , U 1 , U 3 , Y 3 ) ≤ n( 1,n + 2,n ). Combining this with (24) and (25) and substituting into (22), we have H(W 1 |Y 3 ) ≥ nR 1e − n 1 , where 1 = 2δ + 1,n + 2,n , and the equivocation rate satisfies (2).
V. OUTER BOUND
The inner and outer bounds of Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 match under the condition that receiver Y 1 is less noisy than the wiretapper Y 3 [3] , and is achievable by setting U 3 = U 1 in the inner bound. As shown in [5] , the condition that Y 1 is less noisy than Y 3 is a more general one than the condition that Y 3 is a degraded version of Y 1 . Thus, a more general class of channels is considered than the degraded BC case.
To prove the general outer bound in Theorem 2, we use a (2 nR0 , 2 nR1 , n)-code with error probability P (n) e with the code construction so that we have the Markov chain conditions
By Fano's inequality, we have
Then,
where (a) is by Fano's inequality. Expanding the first two terms of (a) by the chain rule, we obtain
By I(S 1 , S 2 ; T |V ) = I(S 1 ; T |V ) + I(S 2 ; T |S 1 , V ), we have
The terms under the summation can be bounded by
Pr{(u 1 (1), u 2 (1, s 2 ), u 3 (1), X(1, s 1 , s 1 , 1, s 2 , 1), y 1 ) ∈ T n (P U1U2U3XY1 )} ≤
where (a) is by the fact that
As such, we have
The converse for nR 0 can be shown following [3] . As n(R 0 +
we have the bounds for n(R 0 + R 1 ),
To show the converse for Corollary 1, we identify
Alternatively, from (32),
where (a) is by I(Y 1,i ;Ỹ i+1
is by I(U 2,i , X i , Y 1,i ; Y 3,i |U 1,i ) = 0 due to Y 3,i → U 1,i → (U 2,i , X i , Y 1,i ). Therefore, we also have
Using the auxiliary random variables U 1,i and U 2,i , we have
Introduce random variable G, independent of all other random variables and takes on value i, i = 1, 2, . . . , n, with probability 1/n. Define U k (G, U k,G ), X X G , Y k Y k,G , k = 1, 2, 3. Then, we can obtain the rate regions in Theorem 2 and Corollary 1 using (33), (34), (36), and (37).
VI. CONCLUSION
A new secrecy capacity region for the general 3-receiver BC with 2 degraded message sets, which is a more general model than the 3-receiver degraded BC with confidential messages, is presented. In the proof of achievability for the inner bound, we used Wyner's code partitioning combined with doublebinning. The proof for the outer bound is shown for the general case; under the condition that receiver 1, to which the private message is directed, is less noisy than the wiretapper, the inner and outer bounds coincide, giving the secrecy capacity of this 3-receiver BC with 2 degraded message sets.
